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CHAPTER 1 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND SETTING 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The primary objective of financial management is the maximisation of 
shareholders’ wealth.  To achieve this objective, management, the custodians 
of shareholders’ interests, are faced with three important categories of 
decision making namely, investment, financing and dividend decisions.  
Investment decisions determine the total value and types of assets a firm 
employs.  Financing decisions determine the capital structure of the firm and 
forms the source on which investment decisions are made.  Dividend 
decisions in the form of dividend policies, which form the focus of this study, 
involve the determination of the payout policy  that management follows in 
determining the size and pattern of cash distributions to shareholders over 
time (Lease, John, Kalay, Loewenstein & Sarig 2000:1).  According to Botha 
(1985:3), the investment, financing and dividend decisions are interdependent 
and must be resolved simultaneously.  A combination of these policy 
decisions should theoretically maximise shareholders’ wealth. 
 
  
3
Kaen (2003:15) sees the corporate governance framework, based on the 
financial agency theory, as a nexus of contracts among individuals in which 
the explicit and implicit contracts control everyone’s self-interests.  These 
contracts are based on managerial performance contracts, employment 
contracts, financial reporting and governance rules for electing and controlling 
boards of directors.   According to Kaen (2003:16), the managerial objective 
of shareholder wealth maximisation is more than an end in itself - it is the 
means to the end of efficient resource allocation and economic growth.  To 
achieve this objective, corporate governance should prevent managers from 
expanding corporations beyond what is economically efficient. This will allow 
shareholders to control the activities of other stakeholders such as 
employees, customers, suppliers and local communities and so forth, which 
might negatively impact on the value of the firm.  Managers should at all times 
act in the best interest of shareholders by striving to maximise shareholders’ 
wealth which manifests itself in the market capitalisation of the firm, that is, 
the market value of the firm’s ordinary shares.  From a valuation standpoint, 
this is also the present value of the residual claims of the firm by its 
shareholders. 
 
In the valuation process, Lease et al (2000:19) state the value of an asset, 
real or financial, is determined by the size, timing, and risk of expected future 
cash flows that accrue to the owner of the asset.  Similarly, markets value 
share prices that are based on expected dividends and the risk attached to 
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ownership of the share (Lease et al 2000:1).  For the shareholders this 
implies that the value of a share is the selling price of the share plus any 
dividends payable whilst owning the share.  Share price is therefore a key 
determinant of the value of the firm.  If dividends are the key indicators of 
share price and the share price the key indicator of firm value, it stands to 
reason that to maximise shareholders’ wealth, shareholders should be 
afforded the highest combination of dividends and the increase in the share 
price. 
 
Risk in the valuation model of shares represents the opportunity cost to 
investors for not investing in similar investment opportunities elsewhere.  Risk 
is measured in the form of returns an investor can earn on other financial 
assets of similar risk.  This risk is made up of market risk that consists of 
macro economic variables such as interest rate changes, inflation, currency 
exchanges and so forth and risks which are unique to the firm such as its 
size, competitive position, research and development programmes and so 
forth.  A valuation model that captures the market risk of a firm is called 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM).  According to Kaen (2003:62), to 
determine an investor’s required rate of return using CAPM, market risk is 
captured by a statistic called beta that measures how a company’s stock price 
moves relative to the market as a whole.  A beta of one is an indication of 
shares that are of equal risk and of similar returns whereas shares with betas 
greater than one are more risky than the average shares and vice versa.   
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Risks which are unique to the firm are usually more difficult to quantify owing 
to the lack of information of the firm on the part of investors.  To minimise this 
risk, investors usually combine high risk shares with lower risk shares in a 
diversified share portfolio. 
 
Other methods of share valuations are also used by investors in establishing 
required rates of return, namely Technical and Fundamental Analyses.  
According to Investec Private Bank College (2003:13), technical analysis 
examines the past price record of the shares and looks for underlying cycles 
to provide information.  Fundamental analysis, on the other hand, involves 
studying the company and its industry or sector to uncover information about 
profitability that could shed new light on the value of a share.  Investors also 
make use of comparables in the process of share valuation.  Investec Private 
Bank College (2003:14), mentions that the most commonly used comparables 
are:  earnings per share (EPS), price to earnings ratio (P/E Ratio) and return 
on equity (ROE).  Kaen (2003:71) states that the reliance on comparables 
stems from the belief that companies that are in the same industry sector and 
are of similar size and capacity should have comparable values. 
 
Growth in the valuation model of share price represents the earnings 
generated by investment decisions in projects that create excess cash flows.  
Management has to decide how these earnings are to be allocated, either by 
reinvesting in the assets of the firm or by way of a distribution to shareholders 
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in the form of a dividend.  In making its decision, management has to 
constantly strive to increase the value of the firm.  This increased value of the 
firm results in a concomitant increase in the value of the market price of the 
share and therefore an increase in the value of shareholders’ wealth. 
 
In order to create excess cash flows, management has to invest in projects 
that have positive net present values (NPV’s).  This is known as applying the 
NPV rule.   The excess cash flows generated by positive NPV projects result 
in higher earnings.  According to Correia, Flynn, Uliana and Wormald 
(2000:587), management can either decide to distribute these earnings as a 
cash dividend or reinvest them in the firm to generate even higher cash flows 
in the future.  The decision to pay a dividend would depend on whether the 
firm can invest the excess earnings in positive NPV projects in the future.  In 
maximising shareholders’ wealth, management should only invest in projects 
with positive NPV values otherwise excess earnings should be paid out to 
shareholders in the form of a dividend. 
 
Kaen (2003:107) states if dividends are paid out to shareholders only after 
surplus earnings have been invested in positive NPV projects then the firm 
follows a residual dividend policy.  In this situation, the payments of dividends 
are closely linked to the availability of excess earnings due to the availability 
of positive NPV projects.  Because of this link between dividends and 
earnings, dividends will mimic earnings from one period to another.  If 
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earnings are good and there are only a limited number of positive NPV 
projects to invest in then the residue of earnings are high and high dividends 
will be paid to shareholders.  The opposite would be true if the situation is 
reversed.  This volatility in dividend payments to shareholders from period to 
period would negatively influence share price because of the difficulty in 
predicting future dividends, a key determinant of share price. 
 
A managed dividend policy, on the other hand, attempts to smooth dividend 
payments relative to earnings and investments.  By following this policy, 
management attempts to fix dividend payments to certain levels of earnings 
and will only increase dividend payments once an increased level of earnings 
can be sustained.   According to Lease et al (2000:31), under a managed 
dividend policy, managers are managing the dividend level and growth. 
Dividends grow in even increments and are predictable.  Shareholders would 
have much more confidence in predicting the dividend in the following year 
than would shareholders under a residual policy.   
 
1.2       PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
According to Miller and Modigliani (1961:411), the effect of a firm’s dividend 
policy on the current price of its shares is a matter of considerable 
importance, not only to management who must set the policy, but also to 
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investors planning portfolios and to economists seeking to understand and 
appraise the functioning of the capital markets. 
 
This poses the question, to what extent, if any, does dividend policy impact on 
firm value and therefore the price of a firm’s shares? 
 
1.2.1 Statement of sub-problems 
 
First sub-problem 
 
• There are two distinct and opposing theories on dividend policy and its 
effect on firm value, namely, the irrelevant dividend theory and the 
relevant dividend theory.  The dividend policy controversy as sparked 
by these two opposing dividend theories have contributed hugely to the 
ongoing dividend debate as to whether dividend policy affects share 
price and therefore the value of the firm (Lease  et al  2000:16). 
 
Second sub-problem 
 
• Around the question of whether dividend policy has an impact on firm 
value, there are two opposing schools of thought.  According to Lease 
et al (2000:xi) there are managers and even a higher percentage of 
academics that question the value added of a carefully chosen 
  
9
dividend policy.  Some go as far as to suggest that dividend policy is 
irrelevant; that one policy is as good as any other and that dividend 
payments should only be made on a residual basis.  Others hold the 
view that a managed dividend policy can positively influence share 
value. 
 
1.3     THE OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Wealth maximisation for shareholders is a combination of dividend payouts 
and an increase in share price.  Management, as custodians of shareholder 
interest, should therefore consciously work towards influencing the share 
price favourably.  The purpose of this study is to examine and analyse, 
through an empirical study, dividend policy and the effect, if any, it has on the 
value of shares by conducting a survey among financial managers to 
measure their views regarding dividends and share value and to either 
validate or disprove the academic explanation of the practice of paying 
dividends. 
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1.4 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS 
 
Dividend Policy 
 
• Dividend policy involves the determination of the payout policy that 
management follows in determining the size and pattern of cash 
distributions to shareholders over time (Lease  et al  2000:1) 
 
Dividend Yield Ratio 
 
• This ratio indicates the return shareholders are obtaining on their 
investments in the form of dividends.  It is determined as follows: 
 
Dividends per share / Market Price per share * 100 
 
 Earnings per share (EPS) 
 
• Earnings are the profits that remain after the payment of preference 
dividend and are attributable to shareholders.  Earnings are expressed 
per share and is determined as follows: 
 
Net Profit after tax / no of shares in issue 
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Maximisation of shareholders’ wealth 
 
• Maximisation of shareholders’ wealth is identical to the maximisation of 
the firm’s market capitalisation or the value of the owner’s equity or the 
price of the ordinary shares (Levy and Sarnat, 1977:526). 
 
Net Present Values (NPV) 
 
• The present value of the expected after-tax cash inflows less the 
present value of the expected after tax cash outflows, with both cash 
flow streams discounted at the project’s risk-adjusted required rate of 
return (Kaen, 2003:74). 
 
Price Earnings Ratio (P/E Ratio) 
 
• This ratio shows how much investors are willing to pay per rand of 
reported profits.  It can be determined as follows: 
 
Price per share / Earnings per share 
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Return on Assets (ROA) 
 
• This ratio measures the profitability of the firm as a whole in relation to 
total assets employed.  It can be determined as follows: 
 
Net profit after tax / Total Assets * 100 
 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
 
• This ratio measures the profitability of the firm as a whole in relation to 
total equity employed.  It can be determined as follows: 
 
Net profit after tax / Total Shareholder’s Equity 
 
1.5 DELIMITATION OF RESEARCH 
 
The study is limited to a survey of companies which operate in the Republic of 
South Africa.  An analysis of the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) 
listed companies will not form part of this study.    
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1.6 STRUCTURE  OF THE REPORT 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the functions of financial management, namely, 
investment, financing and crucially for this study, dividend decisions.  It also 
deals with the various factors that influence the value of shares and methods, 
other than dividends, that investors use in the share valuation process.  Also 
included are the problem statement with its sub problems, the objectives of 
the research, definitions of concepts and finally the delimitation of the 
research. 
 
Chapter 2 deals with the dividend controversy, namely, relevance versus 
irrelevance theories.  A critical analysis of the two opposing theories is 
undertaken and the position taken by the opposing theorists is detailed. 
 
Chapter 3 looks at the different dividend models to explain corporate 
behaviour in respect of dividend decisions taken by management. 
 
Chapter 4 deals with the research design and methodology, including the 
response rate and biographical finding, which will be undertaken to analyse 
the effect that dividend policy has on share value and therefore shareholder’s 
wealth. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the empirical findings of the survey. 
 
Chapter 6 interprets the findings and suggests areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE DIVIDEND CONTROVERSY: RELEVANCE VERSUS IRRELEVANCE 
 
                                                                
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The evolution of dividend policy and its relevance or irrelevance in 
determining firm value and therefore shareholders’ wealth, is examined in this 
chapter.  Lease et al (2000:1) describes dividend policy as the payout that 
management follows in determining the size and pattern of cash distributions 
to shareholders over time. 
 
Numerous empirical research studies have been conducted to prove and/or 
disprove the link that a dividend policy has on firm value.  The basis of these 
research studies has at its origin the two opposing dividend theories, namely, 
relevant or irrelevant dividend theories.  Underlying these two theories are 
investor preference for dividends and/or capital gains.  A firm can either 
distribute all of its earnings as dividends or retain all of its earnings for 
investment in future positive NPV projects.  Depending on the growth phase 
of the firm both these options, although extreme, have positive effects on 
share price and therefore firm value.  However, firms rarely adopt this all or 
nothing approach.  According to Brigham, Gapenski and Ehrhardt (1999: 
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660), the firm’s optimal dividend policy must strike a balance between current 
dividends and future growth so as to maximise the share price. 
 
Gordon and Lintner posits (in Brigham et al 1999:661) that shareholders 
prefer dividends to capital gains because they are less certain of receiving the 
capital gains that are supposed to result from retained earnings than they are 
of receiving dividend payments.  This preference is called the bird-in-the-hand 
theory. 
 
Miller and Modigliani (M and M) (1961:411-433), however, disputed this 
theory more than four decades ago, stating that under certain simplifying 
assumptions, no dividend policy is superior to any other dividend policy and 
that it is therefore irrelevant in firm value and/or maximising shareholders’ 
wealth. 
 
This chapter commences with an analysis of the dividend irrelevance theory 
based on the research conducted by Miller and Modigliani.  This is followed 
by an analysis of the dividend relevance theory.  Although the dividend 
relevance theory is based on numerous research studies this chapter has 
been limited to the works of Lintner and Gordon whose research findings 
were challenged by the irrelevance theory concept. 
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2.2 THE DIVIDEND IRRELEVANCE THEORY 
 
The dividend irrelevance theory is based on the premise that a firm’s dividend 
policy is independent of the value of its share price and that the dividend 
decision is a passive residual.  The value of the firm is determined by its 
investment and financing decisions within an optimal capital structure, and not 
by its dividend decision.  A common dividend policy should be able to serve 
all firms because the dividend policy is irrelevant in determining firm value. 
 
The residual concept of dividends is based on the decision of dividing surplus 
earnings between future investments and the payment of dividends.  Thus a 
firm can either retain all of it surplus earnings for investment in future positive 
NPV projects or distribute dividends from the residue of this surplus earnings 
after providing for investments.  If no surplus earnings remain after providing 
for positive NPV investments, the firm is not obliged to pay dividends.  In this 
manner dividends are seen as a passive residual and are irrelevant in 
affecting firm value.  Alternatively, shareholders are indifferent as to whether 
they receive the expected return on their investment in the form of dividends 
or in the form of an appreciation of share value. 
 
M and M (1961: 425) concluded that the value of the firm is unaffected by the 
distribution of dividends and therefore the dividend policy is irrelevant for the 
determination of share price with a given investment policy. 
  
18
M and M developed their theory in a perfect capital market setting.  The basic 
assumptions underlying this theory (in Cima 2002:14) are: 
 
• that in perfect capital markets no buyer, seller or issuer of securities is 
large enough for their transactions to significantly affect the current 
ruling price. 
 
• that information regarding the ruling price is available to all without 
cost, and no brokerage fees, transfer taxes or other transaction costs 
are incurred in the trading of securities. 
 
• that no tax differentials exist between dividends and capital gains.  
 
• that all investors will behave rationally in that they will prefer more 
wealth to less, and they are indifferent as to whether any given 
increment of their wealth is in the form of cash payments or an 
increase in the market value of their holdings. 
 
• that perfect certainty carries the implication of complete assurance on 
the part of every investor as to the future investment programme and 
future profits of every company.   
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M and M argue (1961: 428-429) that the sum of the present value per share 
after the payment of dividends equal the current value per share before the 
dividend payments.  Stated differently, the prevailing market price of the 
share at the beginning of a period can be defined as the present value of the 
dividend which is paid during the period, plus the present value of the market 
price of the share at the end of that period (Botha 1985:46).  In mathematical 
terms this is reflected as: 
 
Po  = r+1
1 ( )11 PD +     .............................................................(1)   
 
where, 
 
Po = market price of share at the beginning of a period, t1; 
P1 = market price of share at the end of period, t1; 
r  = investors’ required rate of return;  and 
D1 = dividend payment to be received during period t1. 
 
Equation  (1) can be rewritten, given that  
 
n  = number of issued shares at beginning of period t1; 
  and, 
 
Δn = change in the number of issued shares (at price P1) at          
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                      end of period t1; 
 
to read: 
 
nPo = ( )r+1
1   [nD1 + (n   +  Δn) P1   - ΔnP1] ……………..(2)  
 
Equation  (2) simply states that the total value of a firm at the beginning of 
the period is the capitalised value of dividends to be received during the 
period, plus the value of the number of issued shares at the end of the period, 
less the value of the newly issued shares.                  
 
If all investment projects are financed by means of the sale of new shares or 
retained earnings, the total value of new shares to be issued is: 
 
1nPΔ  = I     (E   -  1nD ) ………………………………………..(3) 
 
where, 
 
1nPΔ  = value of new shares to be sold; 
I  = total new capital requirements; 
E =  net earnings;   and, 
1nD  = total dividends paid. 
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Equation  (3)   states that whatever new capital requirements ( I ) are not 
financed by retained earnings (E – nD1), must be financed through the sale of 
shares. 
 
If equation (3) is substituted in equation (2), then 
 
nP0 = ( )r+1
1   [(n   + Δn) P1   - I   +  E] ………………………..(4)  
 
Since dividends are not reflected in equation (4), and as E,I,(n   + Δn) P1  and 
r are independent of D1, M and M conclude that the present value of a 
company’s shares is independent of its current dividend decision.  M and M 
argue that Po is not affected by future dividend decisions, as well as that 
under conditions of perfect certainty, the price of a share at t1, t2, t3  …tn  is 
determined solely by equation (4). 
 
Investors are therefore indifferent towards retained earnings and the payment 
of dividends (with concurrent new issue financing) in all future periods.  Thus, 
shareholders’ wealth is not influenced by current and future dividend 
decisions, but depends entirely on the earning power of the firm’s assets 
(Botha 1985:48). 
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According to Lease et al (2000:46) intuitively, the dividends irrelevance policy 
can be explained as follows:  if an investor desires to receive from a firm cash 
flows that exceed the dividend payment chosen by the firm’s management, 
the investor can create homemade dividends by selling shares  to achieve the 
desired cash flow level.  This reduction in the shareholder’s ownership stake 
in the firm from the sale of shares exactly matches the decline in share value 
the investor would experience if the firm paid the desired dividend.  
Consequently, regardless of whether the firm pays the desired dividend or the 
investor creates a homemade dividend via selling shares, the investor is 
equally well off.  Cash flow needs are equally satisfied and the investor’s 
remaining shares have the same value.   
 
Lease et al (2000:46) continues, positing that if the investor receives dividend 
cash flows that exceed his or her consumption needs, the investor can still 
‘neutralise’ the firm’s dividend decision by reversing the flow of unwanted 
dividends with an equal outflow to purchase additional shares.  With this 
transaction, the value of the shareholder’s interest remains unchanged 
although the shareholder had forgone a dividend payment.  From the firm’s 
standpoint, if the dividend payment under the desired dividend policy exceeds 
the operating cash flows less positive NPV investment expenditures, the firm 
makes up the financing shortfall by selling new shares in the marketplace.  
Under perfect capital markets selling shares is costless, so whether the firm 
finances new investments from internally or externally generated funds is 
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immaterial.  Hence, from both the investors’ and the firm’s perspectives, a 
managed dividend policy is no different from a residual policy. 
 
M and M (in Botha 1985:48-49) abandon the assumption of complete 
certainty in regard to future profits and investments, and consider the case of 
uncertainty.  They admit that dividends and share price are subject to 
uncertainty, but maintain that dividend policy still continues to be irrelevant, 
and base their conclusion upon the arbitrage argument.  The operation of 
arbitraging is taking advantage of market aberrations which present 
opportunity for profitable two-way simultaneous transactions in equivalents, 
that is, operations in which one share is bought and its equivalent sold at 
about the same time.  These market imbalances in the short term, gives rise 
for opportunities for profit taking until an equilibrium point is reached.  The 
assumption is that every investor behaves rationally in preferring more wealth 
to less.  In these circumstances, differences in current and future dividend 
policies will not affect the market price of the two firms – the reason being that 
the present value of future dividends, plus the market prices of the share at 
the end of the period, is the same.  In these circumstances M and M maintain 
that, even under uncertainty, dividend policy is irrelevant and does not affect 
the share price of the firm given the investment policy of that firm. 
 
In summarising the dividend irrelevance theory, Botha (1985:53) states that 
the logic of the irrelevance theory is not disputed given the assumptions on 
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which the theory is based.  There may be a tendency to criticise the theory, 
based on the lack of realism of the assumptions underlying the model.  
However, it is now generally accepted that the value of a model lies in its 
predictive or explanatory power, and that the model cannot be judged by 
reference to the realism of its underlying assumptions. 
 
2.3 THE DIVIDEND RELEVANCE THEORY 
 
On the evolution of dividend distributions, Frankfurter and Wood (1997:31) 
observed the following:  “Our conclusion, based on this study, is that dividend 
payment patterns of firms are a cultural phenomenon, influenced by customs, 
beliefs, regulations, public opinions, perceptions and hysteria, general 
economic conditions and several other factors, all in perpetual change, 
impacting different firms differently.  Accordingly, it cannot be modelled 
mathematically and uniformly for all firms at all times.”  This strange 
phenomenon in respect of dividend policy has baffled researchers since the 
inception of public companies and has led to the now famous comment by 
Black (1976:5), “The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems 
like a puzzle with pieces that just don’t fit together.”  If dividends are irrelevant 
as proposed by M and M, then the dividend enigma deepens as companies 
continue to pay dividends when instead, companies could have retained 
earnings, the cheapest form of financing, to invest in profitable future NPV 
investments. 
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The dividend relevance theory relaxes the assumption of perfect capital 
markets and rational investors.  It analyses, empirically, the behaviour 
patterns of dividend distributions and their effects on the value of the firm.  In 
the real-world, market frictions are not costless and at most investors do not 
always act rationally (Lease et al 2000:45).   
 
The dividend relevance theory was also seen as a reaction to the dividend 
irrelevance theory that stated, under conditions of certainty and uncertainty, 
that changes in dividend policy do not affect firm value.  Botha (1985:55) 
defines dividend policy under the relevance theory, as follows:  “The dividend 
policy is a practical approach which treats dividends as an active decision 
variable and retained earnings as the residue; dividends are more that just a 
means of distributing net profit, and that any variation in dividend payout ratio 
could affect shareholders’ wealth; a firm should therefore endeavour to 
establish an optimal policy that will maximise shareholder’s wealth.” 
 
Lintner and Gordon (in Gitman 1997:574), pioneers of the dividend relevance 
theory argued that shareholders prefer dividends to capital gains.  Gitman 
continues, “Fundamental to this proposition is their bird-in-the-hand argument, 
which suggest that investors are generally risk-averse and attach less risk to 
current as opposed to future dividends or capital gains; current dividend 
payments are therefore believed to reduce investor uncertainty, causing 
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investors to discount the firms earnings at a lower rate, thereby - all else 
being equal - placing a higher value on the firm.” 
 
Lintner’s statistical investigation and analysis (in Botha 1985: 58) shows that 
dividends are “sticky”, in the sense that they are slow to change, and lag 
behind the shifts in earnings by more than one period.  In addition, many firms 
appear to use target payout ratios as a decisional rule in establishing dividend 
policy.  Lintner (in Botha 1985:58) states that firms tend to approach the 
dividend decision by querying whether or not the existing dividend decision 
rate should be changed and, if it should, determine the change.  In 
approaching the target payout ratio, firms use guidelines in respect of the 
speed with which they proceed towards the target in the event of a change in 
earnings.  Lintner expresses this adjustment as a fraction of the difference 
between the current dividend rate and the target ratio. The target dividend 
ratio is expressed as follows: 
 
 ∗itD  = ri  Pit  
 
 where, 
 
 i  = identity of company; 
 t  = period in years; 
 r = target payout ratio;  and, 
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Pt = current year’s earnings after tax. 
 
Lintner ‘s  hypothesis with regard to changes in dividends is reflected in the 
equilibrium equation: 
 
itDΔ  = ai     +     ci  ( ))1( −• − tiit DD    +   itu  …………………….(5) 
 
where, 
                                                                                                                                                  
itDΔ  = change in dividends 
)1( −titD  = previous year’s dividend; 
ai = constant; * 
ci = coefficient, indicating fractional adjustment;  and, 
itu  = error term 
 
*  The constant will be zero for some companies but will generally  be positive 
to reflect the greater reluctance to reduce than to raise dividends, as well as 
the influence of the specific desire for a gradual growth in dividend payments 
found in about a third of the companies in Lintner’s study. 
 
Gordon (1962:269), in response to M and M’s dividend irrelevance theory, 
proposed that the single discount rate that an investor uses to value the 
expected dividend, is an increasing function of the rate of growth in the 
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dividend.  The consequence of this argument is that dividend policy per se 
influences the value of the shares.  Gordon based his findings on two 
assumptions, namely, 
 
• investors have an aversion to risk or uncertainty, and   
 
• given the riskiness of a firm, uncertainty increases as to whether 
dividend payments will take place in the future. 
 
According to Botha (1985:87), the Gordon growth model can be formally 
expressed as follows: 
 
P0  = ∑∞
=1t
( )
( )t
t
r
gD
+
+
1
10   …………………………………………….(6) 
 
where, 
 
P0 = present value of the price of a share; 
D0 = dividend per share; 
g  =  constant rate of growth of dividends:  and 
r = investors’ required rate of return. 
 
Using the above discount growth model, and assuming the number of 
dividend payments to be infinite, the finite present value of a share can be 
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obtained on the assumption that the growth rate in dividends, g, is less than 
the market value of money, r.  The present value of the infinite number of 
growing dividend payments, and therefore the share price, can be rewritten 
as 
 
P0 = gr
D
−
1   
 
which is a variation of the Gordon growth model.  This equation again gives 
the discounted value of the stream of dividend payments to shareholders, 
where the stream is assumed to grow at a constant rate less than the market 
determined rate of interest  (Botha 1985:88). 
 
Gordon (1962: 267) also responded to M and M’s bird-in-the-hand fallacy 
claim which stated that Gordon confused dividend policy with investment 
policy in determining the price of a share.  Gordon argues that when the 
required rate of return on investment equals the rate at which investors 
discount their investments, changing the level of investment has no bearing 
on the share price.  When this occurs, that is, when the required rate of return 
equals the discount rate, profitability of investment is nullified.  Gordon was 
steadfast about not confusing investment policy and dividend policy stating 
that the share price changed because of the change in the dividend rate and 
the change in the dividend rate was as a result of the change in the discount 
rate (Gordon 1962:267). 
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Gordon thus argued, (in Botha 1985:61) that the uncertainty of the future 
makes the price of a share dependent upon the dividend policy.  Therefore 
the greater the present dividend in relation to retained earnings, the higher 
the relative share price is likely to be.  Shareholders are therefore not 
indifferent to dividends and capital gains.  Shareholders prefer the early 
resolution on uncertainty, and will pay a higher price for a share which has a 
greater dividend payout ratio.  Further, future dividends are discounted at a 
rate which increases level of risk.  In other words, if shareholders’ perception 
of risk increases with increasingly distant future returns, Gordon argues that 
any reduction in current dividends in favour of large future dividends might 
lead to a decline in current share price. 
 
With reference to M and M’s dividend irrelevance argument under perfect 
capital markets, shareholders can undo any dividend decision a firm makes 
by selling shares periodically to generate income.  The proceeds from the 
sale of shares for shareholders substitute the dividend lost through the firm’s 
dividend decision, resulting in the shareholder receiving the same income.  
However, Kahneman and Tversky (in Frankfurter and Wood, 2002:11) posit 
that the sale of shares of stock causes more investor regret and anxiety than 
the spending of the cash received from dividend payments.  A subsequent 
price rise of shares sold for income needs increases the regret that 
shareholders experience.  Thus investors do not view capital gains and 
dividend payments as perfect substitutes.   Regret aversion can induce a 
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preference for dividends through the use of a consumption rule based on the 
utilisation of dividends, not invested capital.  
 
According to Baker, Powell and Veit (2002:242), through the years many 
researchers responded to M and M’s dividend policy’s irrelevance conclusion 
by offering many competing hypotheses about why companies pay dividends 
and why investors pay attention to dividends – the “dividend puzzle.”  
Feldstein and Green (1983:17) observed, “The nearly universal policy of 
paying substantial dividends is the primary puzzle in the economics of 
corporate finance”.  Ang (1987:55) concurred, “Thus, we have moved from a 
position of not enough good reasons to explain why dividends are paid, to 
one of too many”.  
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter highlights the two dividend theories and therefore the ongoing 
arguments as to the relevance, or not, of dividend policies on ordinary share 
price and therefore shareholders’ wealth. 
 
The irrelevant dividend theory based on the works of M and M, states that the 
value of the firm is not affected by its dividend policy and is therefore 
irrelevant in the determination of ordinary share price.   
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The relevant dividend theory is based on behavioural dividend models and 
states that under real life market conditions, the value of the firm is affected 
by its dividend policy and is therefore relevant in the determination of ordinary 
share price.  Under market imperfections such as taxes, transaction cost and 
imperfect information, firms tend to adopt a stable and consistent dividend 
policy because firms perceive a dividend policy to be important to 
shareholders for the following reasons: 
 
• Uncertainty of future dividends 
 
• Informational content of dividends 
 
• Agency problems  
 
• Clientele effect 
 
Because firms view dividend policy as important, as defined by the reasons 
stated above, chapter 3 looks at the theoretical models which attempt to 
explain corporate dividend behaviour. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DIVIDEND POLICY MODELS 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Company dividend policy has been a subject of intensive research by 
financial academics during the latter half of the twentieth century and the 
beginning of the current millennium.   This research, based on theoretical 
modelling and empirical examination, attempts to establish a link between 
dividend policy and the value of the firm.  According to Frankfurter et al 
(2002:1), a number of conflicting theoretical models, all lacking strong 
empirical support, define current attempts to explain corporate dividend 
behaviour. 
 
Baker et al (2002: 242) posits that much debate exists about the role, if 
any, of dividend decisions on share price.  Also, both academics and 
corporate managers continue to disagree about whether the value of the 
firm is independent of its dividend policy.  The dividend irrelevant theory, 
first mooted by M and M, argued the case of dividend policy having no 
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impact on firm value.  This position was supported in later research by 
Black and Scholes (1974), Miller (1996) and Miller and Scholes (1978 and 
1982).  Baker et al (2002:242) continues,  “… however, many researchers 
responded to M and M’s dividend policy’s irrelevance conclusion by 
offering many competing hypotheses about why companies pay dividends 
and why investors pay attention to dividends”.  Lease et al (2000:34) 
concurs by stating that dividend relevance becomes much more evident 
when faced with real world market imperfections such as differential tax 
rates, flotation costs, brokerage fees, conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders, and differences in information between 
insiders and outsiders.  Baker et al (2002:243) observes that although 
researchers typically focus on each market imperfection in isolation, there 
may be complex interactions that exist among these frictions.  The 
contention is that if the frictions are slight or insignificant, the M and M 
conclusion about dividend irrelevance may hold otherwise these market 
imperfections may be relevant to a dividend setting process and to the 
value of the firm. 
 
Frankfurter et al (2002:1) further states that the theoretical and empirical 
models of dividend policy can best be explained under the following 
conditions, namely, 
 
• the nature of the market, and/or 
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• the underlying rationale of investors.  
 
Using these conditions as described by Frankfurter et al (2002:1), dividend 
policy formulation could be categorised as follows: 
 
• models formulated in states with full information 
• models in states with information asymmetries 
• models using behavioural principles 
 
This chapter reviews dividend model theories both theoretically and 
empirically, focussing on market imperfections such as tax rates under 
conditions of full information; signalling models, agency problems and free 
cash flow hypotheses under asymmetric conditions; and irrational investor 
behaviour analysed using behavioural principles.   A summary of the 
empirical evidences derived from these theories are made at the end of 
the chapter. 
 
3.2      DIVIDEND POLICY MODELS WITH FULL INFORMATION    
 
3.2.1      The Tax Factor  
 
Lease et al (2000:51) notes that market values of shares are determined 
by discounting expected after tax cash flows.  Consequently, any 
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differential tax treatment of capital gains relative to dividends might 
influence investors’ after-tax returns and, in turn, affect their demand for 
dividends.  Thus a firm may adjust its dividend policy to maximise its 
shares’ market values, thereby influencing the supply of dividends.  Baker 
et al (2002:243) calls this a tax-preference explanation whereby investors 
who receive favourable tax treatment on capital gains may prefer stocks 
with low dividend payouts resulting in certain dividend policies displaying 
tax-induced clientele effects.   
 
3.2.2 The Clientele Effect 
 
According to Botha (1985:70) the tax induced clientele argument is based 
on shareholders’ different tax status, which causes shareholders to have 
preferences in respect of returns from investments.  This argument implies 
that there are three major groups of shareholders, namely, those seeking 
immediate dividend income, those seeking capital appreciation and those 
who are indifferent to both dividend income and capital appreciation.  A 
firm is therefore not faced with only one clientele but with different 
clienteles, with a preference for one dividend policy over another. 
 
According to Brigham and Houston (2004:512) those shareholders who 
are in the immediate dividend category are usually retired individuals or 
university endowment funds.  Such investors are often in low or zero tax 
  
38
brackets.  On the other hand shareholders in high tax brackets would 
prefer appreciation of share values because they have less need for 
dividend income and would probably reinvest the dividend income after 
first paying taxes on those dividends. 
 
Brigham et al (2004:512) continues that if a firm retains and reinvests 
income rather than paying dividends, those shareholders who need 
current income would be disadvantaged.  The value of their shares might 
increase but they might have to incur costs to liquidate some of their 
shareholding to obtain cash.  However, there may be institutional investors 
such as trust funds or pension funds whose constitutions may prohibit 
them from spending out of capital gains and limiting them to expenditure 
from dividend and other investment income only. 
 
Also there may be clienteles who prefer a low dividend payout policy 
because the less the firm pays out in dividends, the lower the 
shareholders’ taxes would be and the less transaction costs they will have 
to incur to reinvest their after-tax dividends.  Therefore, investors who 
want current investment income should own shares in high dividend 
payout firms, while investors who do not require dividend distributions 
should own shares in low dividend payout firms.  Thus different dividend 
clienteles would probably be found in the following life cycles of 
companies, namely, maturity phase for high dividend payout companies, 
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the growth phase for low dividend payout companies and the expansion 
phase for indifference between dividend income and capital growth. 
 
At this point mention has to be made that in South Africa tax induced 
clienteles may not be as prevalent as in the United States or elsewhere in 
the world.  Investors in South Africa are not taxed on dividend income they 
receive.  They are, however, subject to a capital gains tax on the 
difference between the selling and buying prices of shares.  According to 
Firer, Ross, Westerfield and Jordan (2004:565), taken on tax 
considerations only, SA investors ought to prefer companies to pay 
dividends, rather than re-invest the profits which will lead to taxable gains.  
However, from a company point of view, secondary tax on companies 
(STC) is payable on cash dividends distributions.  The introduction of STC 
was to dissuade companies from paying dividends and to promote profit 
retention.  At this point it is not clear whether investors are powerful 
enough to force companies to pay the dividend because of the companies’ 
reluctance to incur the STC tax liability.  Instead, according to Firer et al 
(2004:566) there has been an increase in the number of companies 
issuing scrip dividends.  This dividend payout is in the form of additional 
shares issued instead of cash and is not subject to STC.  However, the 
net effect of scrip dividends is the dilution of the value of each share.   
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3.3       DIVIDEND POLICY MODELS WITH INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES 
 
Management, because of the position they hold in the organisation, 
usually possess confidential information about the organisation whether 
current knowledge or future prospects.  Because of this superior 
knowledge in relation to other stakeholders, information asymmetry exists.  
According to Lease (2000:95), dividend policy is used by managers to 
communicate their superior information to the market.  Management 
therefore uses dividend policy as a communication mechanism. 
 
M and M (1961) asserts that under perfect capital markets, information is 
costless and that all individuals are symmetrically informed and therefore 
the firm’s dividend policy conveys no new information which is already 
known to the markets.  This is in line with M and M’s irrelevant dividend 
theory that states that the value of the firm is independent of its dividend 
policy.  In the real world, however, where market imperfections exist, the 
irrelevance of dividend policy to a firm’s value seems to be inconsistent 
with the empirical evidence of dividends, according to Lease et al 
(2000:96) and Baker et al (2002:241). 
 
Lease et al (2000:96) continues by stating that a multitude of empirical 
research have documented the significant impact that dividend 
announcements have on share prices.  The research shows that dividend 
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increases are greeted with share price increases and the opposite is true 
with dividend decreases.  Empirical research, according to Lease et al 
(2000:97) has provided formal arguments, in the form of dividend 
signalling models, analysing whether dividends payments are a credible 
medium for providing information to the markets. 
 
3.3.1       Dividend Signalling Models  
 
Dividend signalling theories provide a rationale for dividend changes and 
generate hypotheses about the announcement effects of dividends that 
have been observed in the empirical literature.  Baker et al (2002:244) 
states that the signalling models for paying dividends, developed by 
Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock 
(1985) suggest that managers as insiders choose dividend payment levels 
and increases, to signal private information to investors.  According to 
them, managers have an incentive to signal this private information to the 
investment public when they believe that the current market value of their 
firm’s shares is below its intrinsic level.  The increased dividend payment 
serves as a credible signal when other firms that do not have favourable 
inside information cannot copy the dividend increase without unduly 
increasing the chance of later incurring a drop in dividends.  The theorists 
therefore conclude that the dividend signalling hypothesis confirms that 
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increased (decreased) cash dividends should experience positive 
(negative) price reactions. 
 
Dividend announcements signalling future profitability have also been 
established through empirical research conducted by Aharony and Dotan 
(1994), Bernheim and Wantz (1995), Brooks, Charlton and Hendershott 
(1988) and others, as noted in Baker, et al (2002:244).    Most share price 
changes took place immediately following the announcement of a 
dividend, especially positive or negative dividend changes, through 
findings of empirical studies conducted by Aharony and Swary (1980), 
Asquith and Mullins (1983), and Kalay and Lowenstein (1986) as noted in 
Baker et al (2002:244).    However, consistency in findings in respect of 
dividend signalling models, have not been achieved over the years.  
Studies conducted by Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) and De 
Angelo, De Angelo and Skinner (1996)  did not support the hypothesised 
relation between dividend changes and future earnings.  
 
According to Frankfurter et al (2002:5), advocates of the signalling 
theories believe that corporate dividend policy is a cheaper medium of 
conveying private information to the markets than any other media forms.  
Asquith and Mullins (1986) as noted by Frankfurter et al (2002:5) state 
that the use of dividends as signals imply that alternative methods of 
signalling are not perfect substitutes. 
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3.3.2       Agency Relationships 
 
Agency relationships exist because of the separation of ownership and 
management of limited liability corporations.  Although there are many 
stakeholders in the corporation, namely, shareholders, management, 
labour, creditors, customers, etc, shareholders, the theoretical owners of 
the firm, are the dominant influence on management activities.  Lease et 
al (2000:74) states that other stakeholders do not hold significant influence 
in the firm and because of this disparity in influence, an agency 
relationship exists.   Baker et al (2002:244) states that, in their attempt to 
answer the dividend puzzle, firms pay dividends because they wish to 
reduce the agency cost among various stakeholders, especially the 
agency costs between shareholders and management. 
 
The two most important agency relationships that exist with regard to the 
payment of dividends are the agency relationships between  
 
• shareholders and debenture holders, and  
 
• shareholders and management. 
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3.3.2.1  Agency relationships between shareholders and debenture holders 
 
According to Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet as noted  by Frankfurter et al 
(2002:6), agency problems result from information asymmetries through 
potential wealth transfers from debenture holders to shareholders through 
the acceptance of high-risk and high-return projects by managers, and 
failure to accept NPV projects and fringe benefits in excess of the level 
consumed by prudent managers. 
 
Lease et al (2000:7) states that because of the possibility that 
shareholders could default on servicing debt obligations, an imbalance 
exists between shareholders and debenture holders on the results of the 
firm’s operations.  Shareholders enjoy the firm’s economic successes 
whilst debenture holders bear the business risks that could result in 
bankruptcy.  Lease et al (2000:7)  continue by adding that debenture 
holders dislike dividends because dividend payments make the cash flow 
of debenture holders more risky by increasing the chances of default and 
by reducing the value of the assets that have to be used to meet debt 
obligations.  To prevent this from happening and to lessen the tension 
between shareholders and debenture holders, restrictions could be placed 
on the payment of dividends.  This could be accomplished by introducing 
covenants into debt contracts that restrict dividend payments (Lease et al 
2000:78).  However, Kalay (1982), as noted by Frankfurter et al (2002:6) 
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states that a firm’s dividend policy is not a major source of debenture 
holder wealth expropriation because in firms where dividend payments are 
limited by debenture holder covenants, dividend payment levels are still 
below the maximum level allowed by the constraints.   
 
3.3.2.2 Agency relationships between shareholders and management 
 
Easterbrook (1984) as noted by Lease et al (2000:81), suggests that 
dividends may help reduce the agency costs associated with the 
separation of ownership and control.  When shareholders are dispersed, 
there is very little incentive to monitor managers because the costs of 
monitoring outweigh the benefits to individual shareholders.  However, 
when shareholders form groups to pressure management to better serve 
their interests, or when there is high managerial ownership that offers a 
better alignment of shareholder and management goals, the agency costs 
are reduced.  Easterbrook argues that dividend payments force managers 
to raise funds in financial markets more frequently than they would have if 
the did not have to pay dividends.  Dividends therefore subject managers 
to frequent scrutiny by outside professionals, such as investment bankers, 
lawyers and public accountants (Lease et al 2000:81).  This prevents 
managers from acting in their own self-interest or ‘growing’ the business 
beyond the size that maximises shareholders’ wealth (Kaen 2003:110). 
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Allen, Bernado, and Welsh (2000), as noted in Baker et al (2002:245) 
suggests that firms paying dividends attract relatively more institutional 
investors.  Institutions are better informed than individuals and therefore 
hold a relative advantage in detecting high firm quality and using this 
information to help the firm control agency costs. 
 
Easterbrook implies three relationships between dividend policies and 
characteristics of firms, as noted by Lease et al (2000:83).  These 
relationships are: 
 
• where shareholders are involved in management, lower dividends 
are paid out than in similar firms where owner-management conflict 
is higher 
 
• in low leveraged firms shareholders have little demand for 
dividends as a way of maintaining leverage 
 
• in high leverage firms there is a bigger demand for firms to pay 
large dividends. 
 
Easterbrook therefore suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between leverage and dividend payments.  Baker et al (2002:244) 
suggests that shareholders are willing to raise the firm’s leverage to the 
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maximum allowable level in exchange for the increased monitoring that 
the professional investment community provides. 
 
Lang and Litzenberger (1989), as noted in Lease et al (2000:87), 
compared investor reaction to dividend changes by managers suspected 
of over-investing versus managers who do not over-invest.  Using Tobin’s 
q-ratio, managers who optimally invest generate a market-to-book ratio 
that exceeds one.  Here the market value represents the book value of the 
investment plus the NPV of the investment.  Firms with a q-ratio of less 
than one indicates over-investment and therefore when these firms 
increase their dividend payments, markets react favourably because it 
indicates that the firm is reducing its investment in negative NPV projects.  
Markets react less favourable to firms with a q-ratio that exceeds one 
because the increase dividend payments are seen as a natural outcome 
of an optimal investment decision.  The exact opposite is true when firms 
announce a drop in dividend payments.  Lang & Litzenberger found that 
the reaction to dividend changes by firms having a low q-ratio is almost 
four times as large as the reaction to dividend changes by firms having a 
high q-ratio.  This evidence supports the argument that dividends may 
curb managers from investing in projects that do not benefit shareholder 
wealth (Lease et al 2000:87). 
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3.3.2.3     Agency relationship – The free cash flow hypothesis 
 
According to Kaen (2003:110), free cash flow is the cash remaining after 
all debt and lease obligations have been serviced and positive NPV 
investments related to the company’s current operations have been 
funded.  Under the residual theory of cash dividends, this free cash flow 
would be distributed to shareholders as cash dividends. 
 
Frankfurter et al (2002:7) posits that this free cash flow causes conflict 
between management and shareholders.  Dividend and debt interest 
payments reduce the free cash flow available to managers to invest in 
marginal NPV projects and fringe benefit consumption.  According to Kaen 
(2003:110) management is therefore reluctant to lose control over this 
cash.  Managerial compensation, power and status are frequently related 
to firm size.  There is also the danger that management may want to 
ensure that the firm survives in a declining industry.  Dividends are 
therefore a way of removing free cash flows from managerial control in 
firms that face limited investment opportunities. 
 
Lambert, Lanen, and Larker (1989:424) found that where firms adopted 
executive share option plans, the dividend policy selected by management 
could be influenced by these plans.  They concluded that an executive 
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option plan will persuade management to reduce corporate dividends by 
an amount that is equal to the option plan.  They arrived at this conclusion 
because the payment of a dividend will reduce the expected value of a 
share option to a manager.  As a result, management has an incentive to 
reduce dividends after the introduction of executive option plans.  
According to Lease et al (2000:88) these results are consistent with self-
serving management behaviour since management will avoid the dilution 
of their options by paying large dividends. 
 
3.3.2.4     Agency relationship – Behavioural Models 
 
M and M (1961:412) assume that investors are rational and that they 
prefer more wealth to less wealth.  They assume, under perfect capital 
market conditions, that there are no transaction costs and taxes and that 
information is costless.  Under these conditions, investors could easily 
undo any dividend decisions made by management by creating their 
desired cash flow levels through the costless trading of their shares.  
Under these conditions one dividend policy is as good as another (Baker 
et al 2002:245) 
 
However, in real world financial markets, share trading can be expensive 
through transaction costs incurred by investors, such as brokerage fees, 
hedging of share transactions, inconvenience and so forth. Firms also 
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incur flotation costs when banks offer to underwrite shares placed on the 
open market.  Differential tax rates exist elsewhere on share appreciation 
and dividend payments whereas in South Africa dividends are tax free and 
shareholders are taxed on capital gains, that is, on the increased value of 
the share.  On the other hand, firms that declare dividends have to pay 
STC.  Also, information is not costless and information asymmetries exist.  
Finally, in real world financial markets, Lease et al (2000:45) posits that 
investors may be systematically irrational. 
 
The question that remains to be asked and answered in solving the 
dividend puzzle is the following: can dividends be explained in terms of 
rational decision-making based on financial theories or do behavioural and 
psychological influences better explain corporate dividend policy?  Lease 
et al (2000:49) states that investors prefer a managed dividend policy, as 
opposed to a residual dividend policy, to assist them to discipline 
themselves in their investment and consumption decisions.  Accordingly, 
investors formulate rational long term investment plans but have problems 
sticking with their plans in the short term.  Shefrin and Statman (1984), as 
noted in Baker et al (2002:246) formulated a behavioural framework based 
on the theory of self-control and the theory of choice under conditions of 
uncertainty.  They argue that receiving dividends or selling shares are not 
perfect substitutes.  Shefrin and Statman contend that some investors 
prefer cash dividends for self-control reasons, that is, spending cash flows 
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without reducing the equity portion of their investment.  Also, some 
investors prefer dividends for regret avoidance reasons, that is, not having 
to regret the sale of shares to generate cash flows and finding that the 
shares have increased after the sale. 
 
Miller and Shiller (1986), as noted in Baker et al (2002:246) argue that 
introducing behavioural influences to explain dividend policy is justified 
because of the many anomalies that appear in dividend policy.  These 
anomalies are: 
 
• misreading of empirical evidence 
 
• misinterpretation of the basic dividend model, and 
 
• unrealistic expectations of what economic models should 
accomplish. 
 
These anomalies, however, are not of a considerable nature that the 
model has to be reconstructed.  Frankfurter and Lane (1992) posits, as 
noted in Frankfurter et al (2002:8) that from a behavioural point of view, 
dividends can be seen as the socio-economic repercussion of corporate 
evolution. This means that the information asymmetries between 
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management and shareholders cause dividends to be paid to increase the 
attractiveness of share issues. 
 
Frankfurter and Lane (1984) describe, as noted in Baker et al (2002:246) 
several behavioural economic theories of dividends.  These theories are: 
 
• theories based on habitual behaviour.  Waller (1989) posits that 
habits may reflect cultural and societal factors rather than rational 
economic behaviour 
 
• theories, according to Golembiewski (1988), which involve 
bounded rationality, that recognises that an individual cannot 
evaluate all possible choices as required by economic rationality 
 
• theories that involve implicit contracts, as opposed to written 
contracts.  These implicit contracts allow firms to continue paying 
dividends that enable shareholders to value shares based on those 
dividends (Baker et al 2002:247). 
 
Frankfurter and Lane (1984) suggest, as noted in Baker et al (2002:247) 
that the socioeconomic consequences of the evaluation of the modern 
corporation best explain dividend behaviour.  They conclude that 
managers are aware of investor preference for dividends which then 
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ultimately reflect in the value of the firms’ shares.  Management therefore 
continue to pay steady or increasing dividends. 
 
3.4           CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter analysed dividend model theories and highlighted the 
empirical results of different dividend models carried out by a number of 
researchers.   
 
The dividend puzzle, that is, love for dividends by investors and the 
payment of dividends by firms even under adverse economic conditions, 
have intrigued researchers right up to the present time.  According to 
Frankfurter et al (2002; 12) a number of conflicting theoretical models, all 
lacking strong empirical support, define current attempts by research to 
explain the dividend phenomenon.  Not even existing regulatory 
constraints can be blamed for the adoption of a particular dividend policy. 
 
According to Baker et al (2002:256) solving the dividend puzzle needs not 
only a better understanding of the various market imperfections but also 
the interactions of these imperfections.  Researchers have identified the 
key factors that affect dividend policies of firms in the real world.   
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These factors are: 
 
• market imperfections such as taxes, asymmetric information, 
agency costs, transaction costs and flotation costs 
 
• behavioural considerations such as irrational investor behaviour, 
behavioural needs of shareholders and habitual behaviours of 
firms 
 
• firm characteristics such as profitability, investment opportunities, 
size, availability of cash on anticipated future earnings and cash 
flows 
 
• managerial preferences such as smoothing of dividends and the 
reluctance to reduce future dividends (Baker, et al, 2002: 256). 
 
According to Lease et al (2000:179) the optimal dividend policy for each 
firm may be unique as each firm faces a combination of potentially 
different market imperfections with varying levels of relevance.  This is in 
contrast to the theory of dividend models which attempt to generalise the 
findings under any one or all of the factors which affect market 
imperfections or behavioural considerations. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY, RESPONSE RATE AND 
BIOGRAPHICAL FINDINGS 
 
 
4.1       INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter deals with the sample selection, structure of the questionnaire, 
size and scope of the response, further statistics in categorising firms and the 
biographical details of the respondents. 
 
To achieve the research objectives as stated in Chapter 1 (subsection 1.3) a 
specific research strategy consisting of an empirical survey was conducted.  
This research strategy, as set out in Chapter 1 (subsection 1.3), was 
designed to achieve an independent analysis and study of the dividend 
function as used by companies in the Republic of South Africa. 
 
4.2      SELECTION OF THE SAMPLE 
 
The sample consisted of companies, both listed and private, throughout the 
Republic of South Africa.   The requirement was that the company should 
have paid a cash dividend during the past financial year.  Initially, emails 
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containing the questionnaires were sent to Chief Financial Officers (CFO’s) of 
listed companies to extract managements’ views on dividend payments and 
the effect this has on firm value.  After a considerable period of time and 
many telephonic follow-up conversations conducted with a number of these 
listed companies, the response rate was less than one percent of the number 
of questionnaires sent.  As there is only one listed company in the Nelson 
Mandela Bay Region, another strategy had to be devised to improve the 
response rate.  The term ‘listed’ was dropped from the title of the research to 
include private companies who also pay dividends.  Contacts within various 
companies were identified and approached with questionnaires to be 
forwarded to the CFO’s, relying on the responsiveness of these CFO’s to the 
familiarity of these contacts.  A large number of responses were also obtained 
from a contact who works in a Chartered Accountants’ Firm who sent out 
questionnaires to clients of the firm.  Another source of responses was from a 
local company fund manager who sent questionnaires to listed companies.         
 
4.3      STRUCTURE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
The questionnaire (Annexure A) consisted of three sections.  Section A 
contained four questions aimed at obtaining certain biographical information 
about the respondents (such as job title, the total years of business 
experience as well as the business experience gained in the financial function 
and their academic and professional qualifications).   
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Section B contained 23 (22 closed and one open-ended) statements based 
on a rating scale ranging from one to five with one equating to strongly 
disagree and five equating to strongly agree.  The statements empirically 
tested different aspects of the dividend function that included dividend theory 
with regard to dividend relevance and dividend irrelevance as well as dividend 
policies of the residual and the managed variety.  Within the rating scale of 1 
– 5, a mean greater than 3.0 respondents showed an intention to agree, a 
mean less than 3.0 showed an intention to disagree and a mean of 3.0 
showed an intention either to agree or disagree.     
 
Section C contained five questions requesting financial data about the firm 
(describing the main activities of the firm, size of the annual turnover, book 
value of the assets that generate the turnover, the number of employees and 
the development phase of the firm). 
 
A pilot study was conducted by sending five questionnaires to targeted firms 
to test whether the questions were clearly understood and were free of 
ambiguity before it was sent to the sample of firms. 
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4.4 SIZE AND SCOPE  OF THE RESPONSE 
 
A total of 42 completed questionnaires were received from different 
companies, both listed and private, throughout the Republic of South Africa.   
 
Table 4.1 shows the size and scope of Companies (both listed and private) by 
commerce and industry in the sample of 42 questionnaires that were 
returned.  In total, 50 % of the responses were received from Financial and 
Business Services, 31 % from Manufacturing and 19 % from Wholesale and 
Retail. 
 
TABLE 4.1:  Distribution of respondents by commerce and    industry 
Commerce and industry Respondents % 
Manufacturing 13 31,0 
Wholesale and Retail 8 19,0 
Financial and Business Services 21 50,0 
Total 42 100 
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4.5 FURTHER STATISTICS IN CATEGORISING FIRMS (WITHIN 
DEVELOPMENT PHASES OF FIRMS, SALES TURNOVER, TOTAL 
ASSETS AND NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES) OF RESPONDENTS  
(INDEPENDENT VARIABLES) 
 
4.5.1 Classification of firms within development phases of firms 
 
Table 4.2 shows the distribution of companies by classification of firms within 
the development phases of firms.  In total 47, 6 % of responses were received 
from companies within the growth phase, 31,0 % in the maturity phase and 
21,4 % in the start-up phase. 
 
TABLE 4.2:  Distribution of respondents by firm classification          
within the development phases of firms 
Classification of firm Respondents % 
Start-up phase 9 21,4 
Growth phase 20 47,6 
Maturity phase 13 31,0 
Total 42 100 
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4.5.2 Sales Turnover  
 
Table 4.3 shows the distribution of respondents by Rand value of sales.  Of 
the respondents 47,6 % has a sales turnover of greater than R50 million, 
33,3% of respondents a sales turnover of less than R5 million and 19,1 % a 
sales turnover of between R5 million and R50 million. 
 
TABLE 4.3:  Distribution of respondents by Rand value of sales    
turnover 
Sales turnover Respondents % 
<  R5 m 14 33,3 
R5.001 m – R50 m 8 19,1 
R50 m + 20 47,6 
Total 42 100 
 
4.5.3 Total assets 
 
Table 4.4 shows the distribution of the respondents by total asset value.   On 
the extreme ends of the total asset scale an equal number of respondents 
appear (42,9 %) representing total asset value of greater than R30 million at 
the one end and total asset value of less than R3 million  at the other end.   
11.9 % of respondents had an asset value of between R3 million and R30 
million.   2.3 %  of respondents did not divulge their asset values.    
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TABLE 4.4:  Distribution of   respondents by  Rand  value  of  total 
assets 
Total Assets Respondents % 
<  R5 m 18 42,9 
R5.001 m – R50 m 5 11,9 
R50 m + 18 42,9 
No response 1 2,3 
Total 42 100 
 
4.5.4 Number of employees 
 
Table 4.5 shows the distribution of respondents by total number of 
employees.  Of the responses received, a large number of respondents, 
42,9% employed more than 1 000 employees, 52,4 % of respondents employ  
fewer  than  100  employees  and  4.1 % employ between 100 and 1 000 
employees.   
  
 TABLE 4.5:  Distribution  of  responses  by  number  of  employees 
Number of employees Respondents % 
<  100 22 52,4 
101 – 1 000  2 4,7 
1 000 + 18 42,9 
Total 42 100 
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4.6 BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF RESPONDENTS 
 
Table 4.6 shows the distribution of respondents according to their years of 
business experience.  The majority of respondents, 73,8 % have more than 
10 years business experience.  23,8 % of respondents have between six and 
10 years business experience and a small percentage of respondents (2,4 %) 
have five years or less. 
 
TABLE 4.6:  Distribution  of  respondents according to years of total 
business experience 
Years of business experience Respondents % 
0 – 5 1 2,4 
6 – 10  10 23,8 
>10  31 73,8 
Total 42 100 
 
Table 4.7 shows the distribution of respondents according to their years of 
experience in the financial function.  Consistent with the business experience, 
the majority of respondents (54,8 %) are associated with the financial  
function  longer  than  10  years.   Of the remaining respondents, 31 % have 
been associated with the finance function for between six and 10 years and 
14,2 % for 5 years or less. 
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TABLE 4.7:  Distribution  of  respondents according to years of 
experience in the financial function 
Years of financial experience Respondents % 
0 – 5 6 14,2 
6 – 10  13 31,0 
>10  23 54,8 
Total 42 100 
 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter dealt with the selection of the sample, the problems encountered 
in the collection of the data, the structure of the questionnaire, the size and 
scope of the response, further statistics in categorising firms and the 
biographical details of the respondents. 
 
The main conclusions to emerge from this chapter are: 
 
 A total of 42 usable questionnaires were received from a cross- section 
of companies throughout the Republic of South Africa. 
 
 In the classification of firms, 69,0 % of firms were in the developing 
phase consisting of 21,4 % in the start-up phase and 47,6 % in the 
growth phase.  This is significant because developing firms prefer to 
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retain the income for investment purposes rather than pay it out in the 
form of a dividend.   
 
 In terms of further statistics in categorising firms (sales turnover, total 
assets and number of employees) the number of responses were 
received from a diverse number of dividend paying companies.   The 
sample included companies with a sales turnover ranging from less than 
R5 million to greater than R50 million; total assets of less than R5 million 
to greater than R50 million employed in income generation and the 
number of employees ranging from less than 100 to more than 1 000 per 
respondent. 
 
 The majority of the respondents, 73,8 %, have more than 10 years of 
total business experience and consistent with this finding, 54,8 %  of 
respondents have more than 10 years experience in the financial 
function.  This is significant in the light of the value placed on the quality 
of the responses and the legitimacy of the conclusions drawn from these 
responses. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS IN RESPECT OF MANAGEMENTS’ VIEWS ON THE 
DIVIDEND FUNCTION AND ITS ROLE IN  VALUATION  
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to give effect to the research objectives stated in Chapter 1 (section 
1.3), a statistical analysis was undertaken.  The statistical analysis started 
with a survey that was conducted to determine managements’ views on 
dividend payments and the effect on firm value.   
 
The purpose of the survey was to attempt to solve the first and second sub-
problems, Chapter 1 (section 1.2.1), namely, which of the dividend theories, 
relevant or irrelevant, are applied by the majority of the firms in the sample 
and as a consequence of the theory being applied and whether a managed 
dividend policy does influence firm value or whether a dividend policy is 
irrelevant, that is, that one policy is as good as any other in the valuation 
process. 
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The 22 closed statements in the questionnaire, using the rating scale, are  
divided into four categories, namely, dividend relevance, dividend irrelevance, 
managed dividend policy and residual dividend policy. 
 
Of the closed questions, 11 were based on dividend relevance, five on 
dividend irrelevance, five on managed dividend policy and one on residual 
dividend policy.  The open-ended question was based on dividend relevance.   
 
This section deals with the response rate of each statement under the 
appropriate category individually. 
 
5.2 DIVIDEND RELEVANCE 
 
5.2.1 Importance of dividend policy on firm value 
 
Table 5.1 shows the distribution of respondents stating management’s belief 
that a dividend policy is important to the company’s value.  The majority of 
respondents agreed (57,1 %) whereas only 7.1 % disagreed.  The mean was 
3.7 on a scale of one to five with a standard deviation of 0.9. 
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TABLE 5.1:   Distribution of respondents according to the importance   
of dividend policy on firm value 
Importance of dividend policy 
on firm value 
Respondents % 
Strongly disagree 1 2,4 
Disagree 2 4,8 
Neutral 15 35,7 
Agree 16 38,1 
Strongly agree 8 19,0 
Total 42 100 
  
5.2.2 The dividend decision is as important as the investment and financing 
decisions 
 
Table 5.2 shows the distribution of respondents who subscribe to the belief 
that the dividend decision is as important as the company’s investment and 
financing decisions in determining firm value.  Of the respondents, 42,9 % 
agreed, 38,1 % disagreed and 19.1 % could neither agree or disagree.  The 
mean was 3.1 and the standard deviation 1.1. 
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TABLE 5.2:  Distribution of respondents according to the  belief 
that the dividend decision is as important as the 
investment and financing decisions 
Dividend decision is as 
important as investment and 
financing decisions 
Respondents % 
Strongly disagree 1 2,4 
Disagree 15 35,7 
Neutral 8 19,0 
Agree 13 31,0 
Strongly agree 5 11,9 
Total 42 100 
 
5.2.3 Bird-in-the-hand theory of dividend payouts 
 
Table 5.3 shows the distribution of respondents who prefer the bird-in-the-
hand theory of dividend payouts.  Of the respondents, 57,2 % agreed, 16,6 % 
disagreed and 26.2 % could neither agree or disagree.  The mean was 3.4 
and the standard deviation 1.0. 
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TABLE 5.3:     Distribution of respondents that prefer the bird-in-the-
hand theory of dividend payouts 
Preference of bird-in-the-hand 
theory of dividend payouts 
Respondents % 
Strongly disagree 3 7,1 
Disagree 4 9,5 
Neutral 11 26,2 
Agree 23 54,8 
Strongly agree 1 2,4 
Total 42 100 
 
5.2.4 Dividend payments indirectly causes an increase in the firm’s cost of 
capital  
 
Table 5.4 shows the distribution of respondents who believe that dividend 
payments affect a firm’s cash flows causing an increase in the firm’s cost of 
capital.  Of the respondents, 45,3 % were neutral to this statement whereas 
33,3 % agreed and 21.4 % disagreed.  The mean was 3.2 and the standard 
deviation 0.9. 
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TABLE 5.4:     Distribution of respondents  according to the belief that  
dividend payments affect a firm’s cash flows 
Dividend payments affect a 
firm’s cash flows  
Respondents % 
Strongly disagree 1 2,4 
Disagree 8 19,0 
Neutral 19 45,3 
Agree 11 26,2 
Strongly agree 3 7,1 
Total 42 100 
 
5.2.5 An increase in a dividend payout causes an increase in share price    
  
Table 5.5 shows the distribution of respondents who subscribe to the belief 
that an increase in dividend payout results in an increase in share price.  Of 
the respondents, 47,6 % were neutral  to this statement whereas 33,3 % 
agreed and 19.1 % disagreed.  The mean was 3.1 and the standard deviation 
0.7. 
 
  
75
TABLE 5.5:       Distribution of respondents according to the belief that 
an increase in dividend payouts results in an increase 
in share price    
An increase in dividend payout 
result in an increase in share 
price 
Respondents % 
Disagree 8 19,1 
Neutral 20 47,6 
Agree 14 33,3 
Total 42 100 
 
5.2.6 A decrease in a dividend payout causes a decrease in share price    
 
Table 5.6 shows the distribution of respondents who subscribe to the belief 
that a decrease/omission in dividend payout results in a decrease in share 
price.  Of the respondents, 35,7 % agreed, 28,6 % disagreed and 35.7 % 
could neither agree or disagree.  The mean was 3.1 and the standard 
deviation 0.8. 
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TABLE 5.6:         Distribution of respondents according to the belief that 
a decrease/omission in dividend payouts results in a 
decrease in share price    
A decrease in dividend payout 
result in a decrease in share 
price 
Respondents % 
Disagree 12 28,6 
Neutral 15 35,7 
Agree 14 33,3 
Strongly agree 1 2,4 
Total 42 100 
 
5.2.7 Dividend payments prevent surplus cash flows from being used in 
unprofitable investments 
 
Table 5.7 shows the distribution of respondents who believe that dividend 
payments remove excess cash flows from being invested in negative NPV 
projects.  Of the respondents, 50,0 % agreed, 26,2 % disagreed and 23.8 % 
could neither agree or disagree.  The mean was 3.5 and the standard 
deviation 1.3. 
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TABLE 5.7:     Distribution of respondents according to the belief that 
dividend payments remove excess cash flows from 
being invested in negative NPV projects  
Dividend payments remove 
excess cash flows 
Respondents % 
Strongly disagree 2 4,8 
Disagree 9 21,4 
Neutral 10 23,8 
Agree 8 19,0 
Strongly agree 13 31,0 
Total 42 100 
 
5.2.8 Dividend paying firms are more closely scrutinised by financial analysts 
to assess managements’ role in building firm value 
 
Table 5.8 shows the distribution of respondents who believe that dividend 
payments results in closer scrutiny of management in building firm value.  Of 
the respondents, 47,6 % disagreed with this statement, 14,3% agreed and 
38.1 could neither agree or disagree.  The mean was 2.5 and the standard 
deviation 0.9. 
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TABLE 5.8:   Distribution of respondents who believe that    
dividend payments results in closer scrutiny of 
management in building firm value    
Dividend payments results in 
closer scrutiny of management 
in building firm value  
Respondents % 
Strongly disagree 5 11,9 
Disagree 15 35,7 
Neutral 16 38,1 
Agree 6 14,3 
Total 42 100 
 
5.2.9 Dividend payments should satisfy shareholders’ dividend preference 
rather than depend on the firms’ investing or financing decisions 
 
Table 5.9 shows the distribution of respondents who believe that dividend 
payments should satisfy shareholders’ preference for dividends.  Of the 
respondents, 35,7 % agreed, 33,3 % disagreed and 31.0 % could neither 
agree or disagree.  The mean was 3.0 and the standard deviation 1.1. 
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TABLE 5.9:   Distribution of respondents who believe that    
dividend payments should satisfy shareholders’ 
preference for dividends   
Dividend payments should 
satisfy shareholders’ preference 
for dividends 
Respondents % 
Strongly disagree 3 7,1 
Disagree 11 26,2 
Neutral 13 31,0 
Agree 12 28,6 
Strongly agree 3 7,1 
Total 42 100 
 
5.2.10   Dividend payments are better signals of confidential information than  
other media forms 
 
Table 5.10 shows the distribution of respondents who believe that a dividend 
payment is a better signalling mechanism than other media forms.  Of the 
respondents, 50,0 % agreed, 19,0 % disagreed and 31.0 % could neither 
agree or disagree.  The mean was 3.3 and the standard deviation 1.1. 
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TABLE 5.10:   Distribution of respondents who believe that a 
dividend payment is a better signalling mechanism 
than other media forms  
A dividend payment is a better 
signalling mechanism than 
other media forms  
Respondents % 
Strongly disagree 3 7,1 
Disagree 5 11,9 
Neutral 13 31,0 
Agree 17 19,0 
Strongly agree 4 31,0 
Total 42 100 
 
5.2.11 A formal dividend policy gives shareholders the assurance of 
predictable dividend payments 
 
Table 5.11 shows the distribution of respondents who believe that a formal 
dividend policy gives the assurance of predictable dividend payments.  Of the 
respondents, an overwhelming majority of 78,6 % agreed, 4,8% disagreed 
and 16,6% could neither agree or disagree.  The mean was 3.9 and the 
standard deviation 0.7. 
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TABLE 5.11:   Distribution of respondents who believe that a formal 
dividend policy gives the assurance of predictable 
dividend payments 
A formal dividend policy gives 
the assurance of predictable 
dividend payments 
Respondents % 
Disagree 2 4,8 
Neutral 7 16,6 
Agree 27 64,3 
Strongly agree 6 14,3 
Total 42 100 
 
5.3 DIVIDEND IRRELEVANCE 
 
5.3.1 A common dividend policy can be used by all firms 
  
Table 5.12 shows the distribution of respondents who believe that a common 
dividend policy could be used by all companies in determining firm value.  Of 
the respondents, 54,8 % disagreed, 16,7 % disagreed and 28.5 % could 
neither agree or disagree.  The mean was 2.5 and the standard deviation 0.9. 
 
  
82
TABLE 5.12:   Distribution of respondents who believe that a 
common dividend policy could be used by all 
companies in determining firm value 
A common dividend policy 
could be used by all companies 
in determining firm value 
Respondents % 
Strongly disagree 5 11,9 
Disagree 18 42,9 
Neutral 12 28,6 
Agree 5 11,9 
Strongly agree 2 4,7 
Total 42 100 
 
5.3.2 A  dividend policy does not affect firm value 
 
Table 5.13 shows the distribution of respondents who believe that a 
company’s dividend policy is independent of its share price in determining 
firm value.  Of the respondents, 33,3 % agreed, 33,3 % disagreed and 33.4 % 
could neither agree or disagree.  The mean was 3.1 and the standard 
deviation 1.1. 
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TABLE 5.13:   Distribution of respondents who believe that a 
company’s dividend policy is independent of its 
share price in determining firm value 
A company’s dividend policy is 
independent of its share price in 
determining firm value 
Respondents % 
Strongly disagree 4 9,5 
Disagree 10 23,8 
Neutral 14 33,3 
Agree 12 28,6 
Strongly agree 2 4,8 
Total 42 100 
 
5.3.3 Shareholders’ indifference to receiving dividends or increase in 
shareholding 
 
Table 5.14 shows the distribution of respondents who believe that 
shareholders are indifferent to receiving dividends as opposed to an increase 
in the value of shareholdings.  Of the respondents, 54,7 % disagreed to this 
statement, 19,1% agreed and 26.2 could neither agree or disagree.  The 
mean was 2.6 and the standard deviation 0.9. 
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TABLE 5.14:   Distribution of respondents who believe that 
shareholders are indifferent to receiving dividends as 
opposed to an increase in the value of shareholdings 
Shareholders are indifferent to 
receiving dividends as 
compared to share increases  
Respondents % 
Strongly disagree 3 7,1 
Disagree 20 47,6 
Neutral 11 26,2 
Agree 7 16,7 
Strongly agree 1 2,4 
Total 42 100 
 
5.3.4 Dividend policies have no effect on the intrinsic value of shares 
 
Table 5.15 shows the distribution of respondents who believe that dividend 
policies have no effect on the intrinsic value of shares.  Of the respondents, 
54,8 % were neutral  to this statement whereas 26,2 % disagreed and only 
19.0 % agreed.  The mean was 2.8 and the standard deviation 0.9. 
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TABLE 5.15:   Distribution of respondents who believe that a 
dividend policy has no effect on the intrinsic value of 
shares 
A dividend policy has no effect 
on the intrinsic value of shares 
Respondents % 
Strongly disagree 5 11,9 
Disagree 6 14,3 
Neutral 23 54,8 
Agree 7 16,7 
Strongly agree 1 2,3 
Total 42 100 
 
5.3.5 Dividend declaration’s effect on share price is short-lived 
 
Table 5.16 shows the distribution of respondents who believe that dividend 
announcements only cause temporary share price adjustments.  Of the 
respondents, 50,0 % agreed, 21,4 % disagreed and 28.6 % could neither 
agree or disagree.  The mean was 3.9 and the standard deviation 0.7. 
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TABLE 5.16:   Distribution of respondents who believe that 
dividend announcements only cause temporary 
share price adjustments 
Dividend announcements only 
cause temporary share price 
adjustments 
Respondents % 
Strongly disagree 1 2,4 
Disagree 8 19,0 
Neutral 12 28,6 
Agree 17 40,5 
Strongly agree 4 9,5 
Total 42 100 
 
5.4 MANAGED DIVIDEND POLICY 
 
5.4.1 Optimal dividend policies strike a balance between dividend payments 
and future growth 
 
Table 5.17 shows the distribution of respondents who apply an optimal 
dividend policy that strike a balance between dividend payments and future 
growth.  Of the respondents, an overwhelming majority of 66,7 % agreed, 
4,7% disagreed and 28,5% could neither agree or disagree.  The mean was 
3.8 and the standard deviation 0.8. 
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 TABLE 5.17:   Distribution of respondents who apply optimal 
dividend policies, striking a balance between 
dividend payments and future growth 
Optimal dividend policies strike 
a balance between dividend 
payments and future growth 
Respondents % 
Strongly disagree 1 2,4 
Disagree 1 2,4 
Neutral 12 28,5 
Agree 21 50,0 
Strongly agree 7 16,7 
Total 42 100 
 
5.4.2 Changing dividend payments to signal favourable future prospects 
 
Table 5.18 shows the distribution of respondents who change dividend 
payments in order to signal favourable future prospects,.  Of the respondents, 
61,9 % were neutral  to this statement whereas 26.2 % disagreed and 11,9 % 
agreed.  The mean was 2.8 and the standard deviation 0.8. 
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TABLE 5.18:   Distribution of respondents who change dividend 
payments to signal favourable future prospects 
Changing dividend payments to 
signal favourable future 
prospects 
Respondents % 
Strongly disagree 4 9,5 
Disagree 7 16,7 
Neutral 26 61,9 
Agree 5 11,9 
Total 42 100 
 
5.4.3 Avoiding making  regular changes to dividend payments in the short-
term 
 
Table 5.19 shows the distribution of respondents who avoid changing regular 
dividend payments if the change has to be reversed the following year.  Of 
the respondents, 52,4 % agreed, 7,1 % disagreed and 40.5 % could neither 
agree or disagree.  The mean was 3.5 and the standard deviation 0.8. 
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TABLE 5.19:   Distribution of respondents who avoid changing 
regular dividend payments 
Avoiding changes to regular 
dividend payments 
Respondents % 
Disagree 3 7,1 
Neutral 17 40,5 
Agree 17 40,5 
Strongly agree 5 11,9 
Total 42 100 
 
5.4.4 Maintenance of steady or modestly growing dividend payments 
 
Table 5.20 shows the distribution of respondents whose dividend policy 
maintain steady or modesty growing dividend payments.  Of the respondents 
an overwhelming majority of 69,1 % agreed, 11,9% disagreed and 19,0% 
could neither agree or disagree.  The mean was 3.7 and the standard 
deviation 0.9. 
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TABLE 5.20:   Distribution of respondents who maintain steady or 
modestly growing dividend payments 
Maintenance of steady or 
modestly growing dividends 
Respondents % 
Disagree 5 11,9 
Neutral 8 19,0 
Agree 23 54,8 
Strongly agree 6 14,3 
Total 42 100 
 
5.4.5 Adjusting dividend payments towards a target payout ratio 
 
Table 5.21 shows the distribution of respondents who regularly adjust 
dividend payments towards a target payout ratio.  Of the respondents, 52,3 % 
agreed, 16,7 % disagreed and 31.0 % could neither agree or disagree.  The 
mean was 3.4 and the standard deviation 0.9. 
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TABLE 5.21:   Distribution of respondents who adjust dividend 
payments towards a target payout ratio 
Adjustment of dividend 
payments towards a target 
payout ratio 
Respondents % 
Strongly disagree 1 2,4 
Disagree 6 14,3 
Neutral 13 31,0 
Agree 18 42,8 
Strongly agree 4 9,5 
Total 42 100 
 
5.5      RESIDUAL DIVIDEND POLICY 
 
5.5.1 Declaration of dividends only after financing of desired investments 
 
Table 5.22 shows the distribution of respondents who declare dividends only 
after desired investments have been financed.  Of the respondents, an 
overwhelming majority of 88,1 % agreed, 4,8% disagreed and 7,1% could not 
agree either way.  The mean was 4.3 and the standard deviation 0.8. 
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TABLE 5.22:   Distribution of respondents who declare dividends 
only after desired investments have been financed 
Declaration of dividends only 
after desired investments have 
been financed 
Respondents % 
Disagree 2 4,8 
Neutral 3 7,1 
Agree 16 38,1 
Strongly agree 21 50,0 
Total 42 100 
 
 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter dealt with analysing responses based on managements’ views 
on dividend payments and the effect on firm value.  Because the dividend 
policy is a natural consequence of dividend theory being applied, the 
conclusions to the study are categorised under the dividend policies, namely,   
the managed dividend policy, a consequence of the relevant dividend theory 
and the residual dividend policy, a consequence of the irrelevant dividend 
theory. 
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5.6.3 Managed dividend policy 
 
The majority of respondents agreed with the following dividend policy 
statements: 
 
 an optimal dividend policy strikes a balance between dividend 
payments and the growth of the firm 
 a dividend policy that avoids making changes to regular dividend 
payments if the change has to be reversed  in the short-term 
 a dividend policy that maintains  steady or modestly growing dividend 
payments 
 a dividend policy that adjusts dividend payments towards a target 
payout ratio 
 
The above policy statements are a consequence of the majority of 
respondents agreeing to the following statements on dividend relevant theory: 
 
 importance of dividend policy on firm value 
 the bird-in-the-hand theory of dividend payments 
 dividend payments prevent surplus cash flows from being used in 
unprofitable investments 
 dividend payments are better signals of confidential information than 
other media forms 
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 a formal dividend policy gives the assurance of predictable dividend 
payments 
 
5.6.4 Residual dividend policy 
 
The majority of respondents agreed with the following dividend policy 
statement: 
 
 firms declare dividends only after financing of desired investments 
 
A majority of respondents disagreed to the following statements on the 
dividend irrelevance theory and on which a residual dividend policy is based: 
 
 a common policy can be used by all firms to determine firm value 
 shareholders are indifferent to receiving dividends as compared to 
share increases 
 dividend policies have no effect on the intrinsic value of shares 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In chapter 1 it was mentioned that although investment, financing and 
dividend decisions are independent, they have to be resolved simultaneously.  
This simultaneous resolution of decision making processes ensures that the 
goal of the financial function is reached thereby ensuring the maximisation of 
shareholders’ wealth.  
 
Against the backdrop of improving firm value and therefore shareholders’ 
wealth, the main purpose of this research has been to examine and analyse 
dividend policies of companies throughout the Republic of South Africa.  This 
was to establish whether dividend policies have an effect on the value of a 
firm and therefore the value of a share.  This was accomplished by 
conducting a survey among management of firms.  The survey was drawn up 
from normative theories based on the dividend function. 
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This chapter looks at the significant empirical findings that emerged from the 
empirical survey conducted.  Areas for possible future research are also 
considered.   
 
6.2 SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS IN RESPECT OF THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
The findings and interpretation of the empirical survey are more of a 
qualitative nature as it analyses management’s views on the dividend function 
and departs from the usual methodology of researching the dividend function 
which is quantitative statistics based on market research of securities’ 
exchanges.  
 
6.2.1 Findings:  Relevance versus Irrelevance Theory 
 
In respect of the dividend relevance theory the majority of respondents were 
in agreement with most of the aspects which are in adherence to the theory.  
Statistically, the following statements have been significantly supported: 
• importance of dividend policy on firm value – 57,1 %  
• bird-in-the-hand theory of dividend payments – 57,2 % 
• a formal dividend policy gives the assurance of predictable  dividend 
payments – 78,6 % 
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In respect of dividend irrelevance theory the majority of respondents 
disagreed with statements that were in support of the theory.  These 
statements are  
 
• a common dividend policy can be used by all firms – 54,8 % disagreed 
• shareholders are indifferent to receiving dividends as compared to 
share increases – 54,7 % disagreed 
 
6.2.2 Findings:  Residual Dividend Policy versus Managed Dividend Policy 
 
An important finding has been that 88,1 % agree with the residual dividend 
policy  philosophy of declaring dividend only after financing of desired 
investments.  The reason for the agreement with the above policy statement 
is that 69,0 % of the respondents are either in the start-up or growth phases 
of development.  Dividend payments are therefore a consequence only after 
desired investments have been financed from retained income which is a 
firm’s cheapest form of financing. 
 
In respect of a managed dividend policy, the respondents agreed 
overwhelmingly with the following statements: 
 
• Optimal dividend policies strike a balance between dividend payments 
and future growth – 66,7 %  
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• Maintenance of steady or modestly growing dividend payments – 69,1 % 
• Avoidance of regular dividend payment changes if it cannot be 
sustained in the foreseeable future – 52,4 % 
• Adjusting dividend payments towards a target payout ratio – 52,3 % 
 
6.3 AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Research on the dividend function around the world has largely, over the  
years, been confined to rational models based on market data collected on 
securities’ exchanges.  Baker et al (2002:242) observed that the dividend 
puzzle, namely, the reason why companies pay dividends and why investors 
favour dividends, has not even come close to being solved.   Instead of 
continuing with rational models to solve the dividend puzzle, Frankfurter, 
Kosedag, Schmidt and Topalov (2002:202) believes that to understand the 
dividend enigma people’s perception of the subject has to be determined.   
 
Areas for future research in respect of the dividend function may be 
behavioural aspects of investors in respect of: 
 
• theory of self-control and choice under conditions of uncertainty 
 
• theory of habitual behaviour which defies rational economic behaviour 
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Finally, closer cooperation between academia and the corporate world should 
be forged in a meaningful partnership that will be mutually beneficial to all 
parties.  Corporations view financial matters as confidential and are 
uncooperative in disclosing such information.   Consequently, researchers are 
constrained in resolving problems facing corporations because of the latter’s 
reluctance to provide the required information. 
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ANNEXURE A Questionnaire and supporting documents 
  
 
 
7 August 2007 
 
 
  
Sir/Madam 
 
MANAGEMENTS’ VIEWS ON DIVIDEND PAYMENTS AND THE EFFECT ON FIRM VALUE 
 
I am currently engaged in a project seeking the views of management in respect of the payment of 
dividends and to establish the importance management places in finding a ‘happy’ medium between 
said payments and retaining profits.   
 
Attached, is a questionnaire which should not take you longer than Ten (10) minutes to complete.  
The questionnaire consists of a part A (biographical), part B (rating scale) and part C (economies of 
scale) and requires no confidential information.  However, confidentiality will be respected with regard 
to the actual responses. 
 
I am well aware that you are inundated with many similar requests.  However, we need to know what 
happens in the real world of financial management to test the theory with reality.  Your participation 
will provide valuable feedback and will enhance the teaching of financial management. 
 
It will be well appreciated if the questionnaire could be completed by 25 August 2007 and returned 
either via email, fax or could be collected.   
 
Yours faithfully 
 
 
Paul Barman      Prof PJW Pelle 
Lecturer       Promoter 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University   Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University 
Faculty of Business and Economic Sciences   Head: Dept of Management Accounting  
Phone:  (041)  5043821     Phone: (041) 5043833 
Fax:  (041) 5049821       
mailto:  Paul.Barman@nmmu.ac.za      
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SECTION A 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS 
 
What is your job title? 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
How many years of total business experience do you have? 
 
2 
0 - 1 year 2 - 5 years 6 - 10 years More than 10 years 
How many years of business experience, specifically in the financial 
function, do you have? 
 
3 
0 -1 year 2 - 5 years 6 - 10 years More than 10 years 
What are your academic and/or professional qualifications? 
 
FIRST ACADEMIC 
QUALIFICATION(S) 
 
SECOND AND FURTHER 
ACADEMIC QUALIFICATION(S) 
 
4 
PROFESSIONAL 
QUALIFICATION(S) 
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SECTION B   
1 = Strongly  Disagree             4 = Agree 
2 = Disagree                              5 = Strongly Agree 
3 = Neutral 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
1 Management in your company subscribe to the 
belief that a dividend policy is important because of 
the effect it has on the company’s share price and 
therefore its value. 
 
     
2 Management in your company subscribe to the 
belief that the company’s dividend decision is as 
important as the company’s investment and 
financing decisions in determining firm value. 
 
     
3 Your company applies an optimal dividend policy 
that strives to strike a balance between current 
dividends and future growth to maximise share 
price. 
 
     
4 Management in your company subscribe to the 
belief that a common dividend policy could be used 
by all companies because no dividend policy is 
superior to any other dividend policy in determining 
firm value. 
 
     
5 Management of your company declare dividend 
payouts from surplus earnings only after they are 
satisfied desired investments have been financed. 
 
     
6 Management views shareholders as preferring the 
bird-in-the-hand theory of dividend payouts, that is, 
receiving dividend payouts sooner rather than later 
because of the uncertainty of future dividends.  
 
     
7 Dividend payouts, generally, affect a firm’s cash 
flows causing the firm to seek financing from capital 
markets resulting in an increase in the firm’s cost of 
capital. 
     
8 Management changes the dividend payout when 
share prices are undervalued, to signal favourable 
prospects to investors. 
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9 Management in your company subscribe to the 
belief that a company’s dividend policy is 
independent of its share price in determining firm 
value. 
 
 
 
    
10 An increase in a dividend payout is usually 
accompanied by an increase in the share price. 
 
     
11 A decrease or omission of a dividend payout is 
usually accompanied by a decrease in the share 
price. 
 
     
12 Your company applies a dividend policy that avoids 
changing its regular dividend payout if that change 
might have to be reversed the following year. 
 
     
13 Management of your company are of the opinion 
that shareholders are indifferent to receiving a 
dividend as opposed to an increase in the value of 
their shares. 
 
     
14 Dividend payouts remove excess cash flows from 
being invested in negative NPV projects that 
negatively impact firm value. 
  
     
15 Dividends payouts necessitate a firm to seek more 
external financing, which subjects the firm to 
scrutiny from financial analysts to assess whether 
management act in the best interest of 
shareholders in building firm value. 
 
     
16 Your company strives to maintain steady or 
modestly growing dividends in applying its dividend 
policy. 
 
     
17 Management in your company subscribe to the 
belief that dividend policies have no effect on the 
intrinsic value of shares. 
 
     
18 Dividend payouts should not depend on the 
financing or investment decisions of the firm but 
rather to satisfy shareholders’ preference for 
dividends. 
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19 Dividend payouts as a signalling mechanism about 
future prospects are more believable to investors 
than other media forms. 
 
     
20 In applying its dividend policy your company 
regularly adjust its dividend payout towards a 
predetermined target payout ratio 
 
     
21 Management in your company view dividend 
announcements as causing only temporary share 
price adjustments and therefore the effect on firm 
value is negligible. 
 
     
22 A formal dividend policy gives shareholders the 
assurance that dividend payouts will be treated in a 
predictable instead of an inconsistent manner. 
 
     
23 Is the dividend decision, in your opinion, as important as the financing and 
investment decisions in determining firm value?  
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SECTION C – Only to be completed by private/unlisted 
companies 
FINANCIAL DATA OF THE COMPANY 
 
How would you briefly describe the main activities of you company? 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
What is the Rand value of the firm’s turnover per annum? 
                                   
2 
R5 000 000 
or less 
R5 000 001 
to 
R25 000 000 
R25 000 001 
to 
R50 000 000 
More than 
R50 000 000 
 
What is the book value of the firm’s total assets? 
 
3 
R3 000 000 
or less 
R3 000 001 
to 
R10 000 000 
R10 000 001 
to 
R30 000 000 
More than 
R30 000 000 
 
How many people do you currently employ? 4 
 
10 or less 
 
 
 
11 to 100 
 
 
101 to 1 000 
 
  
 More than 1 000 
 
Within the development phases of firms, how would you classify your firm? 
 
5 
Start-up phase 
 
Growth phase Maturity phase 
 
Thank you for your time and invaluable knowledge in the completion of this questionnaire. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Paul Barman 
Lecturer 
Department of Management Accounting 
Faculty of Business and Economic Sciences 
PO Box 77000 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University 
6031 
Phone:  (041)  5043821 
Fax:  (041) 5049821 
mailto:  Paul.Barman@nmmu.ac.za 
 
